



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

A CLASSIFICATION FOR FABLES, BASED ON THE COLLECTION OF MARIE DE FRANCE

Schemes of classification for the fable are less numerous than definitions of the fable, but they are certainly not few. A review of several of the more important will reveal a general failure to base classification on any essential characteristic—division is made with respect to something superficial or remote. The main function of classification in the present case would seem to be the assistance it would offer in conceiving clearly the essential nature of the type and in testing and elaborating principles laid down in the definition. I venture to repeat a definition arrived at in an earlier article:¹ a fable is a short tale, obviously false, devised to impress, by the symbolic representation of human types, lessons of expediency and morality.

Division between *genre* and *genre* is usually represented by a strip of debatable land, and varieties within any particular type must, to any but the most superficial classification, be even more blurred at the boundaries. The different varieties are often to be considered as stations on a line of variation between two extremes rather than as isolated categories. It is solely with the intention of marking out for the fable more clearly than I have marked out in my definition the "curve" of this line, by indicating certain determining dots, that I offer one more scheme for classification. I am very certain that with respect to assignment among the subdivisions of the main classes, two people, in the case of some fables, would hardly agree. On the other hand, that these substations do exist between the main stations on the line is apparent, and some fables are nearer one and some nearer another.

The more important existing classifications can be quickly set forth. Aphthonius (300 A.D.) made a division on the basis of the kind of actors appearing in the fable, distinguishing fables employing men, those in which unintelligent creatures appeared, and those in which both were to be found. This scheme formed the basis for

¹ "The Fable and Kindred Forms," *Jour. of Eng. and Germ. Phil.*, XIV, 519-29.

Wolff and eventually Lessing.¹ Herder divided into *theoretische oder Verstand bildende*, i.e., those designed to exercise the reason; *sittliche*, those designed to impress rules for the will; and *Schicksalsfabeln*, those designed to show the force of a chain of circumstances, fate, or chance, a classification based exclusively on purpose, irrespective of method.² Beyer offers "serious" and "humorous," and Gotschall *epigrammatische* and *humoristische*, a mere general distinction between the fables of Aesop and those of La Fontaine.³ Lessing first offers *einfache* and *zusammengesetzte*, the latter consisting of fables followed by a second narrative applying the law of the fable by means of human actors.⁴ Later he presents as his proper classification that of Aphthonius, modified by Wolff, and used with new meanings attached to the terms employed.

According to this classification, fables are to be divided into the *vernünftige*, the *sittliche*, and the *vermischte*. These terms Lessing defines respectively as indicating (1) those fables which are possible and unconditioned by any necessary assumption; (2) those to which possibility can be accredited only after some preliminary assumption has been made; and (3) those mingling elements of both the preceding classes. Under the second heading he has two subdivisions: the *mythische*, which introduce unreal personages, and the *hyperphysische*, in which the characters are real, but have heightened properties. Finally, under the *vermischte*, he has the *vernünftig mythische*, or part unconditioned, part mythical; the *vernünftig hyperphysische*, or part unconditioned, part heightened in characters; and the *hyperphysische mythische*, or those mingling characters heightened and mythical.

The first category, the unconditioned, presents the same difficulty as Lessing's definition of the fable: it admits into the type illustrative tales which are not fables. In general, however, this is the most philosophical classification: it attempts to distinguish on the basis of what Lessing considers the essential for effectiveness, the fable's real

¹ Lessing, *Fabeln, drei Bücher, nebst Abhandlungen mit dieser Dichtungsart verwandten Inhalts*, 1759, in *Sämmt. Schrift.*, V, 438.

² L. Hirsch, *Die Fabel* (Cöthen, 1894), p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Lessing, *loc. cit.*

or apparent possibility. With this in view, Lessing classifies according to the assumptions necessary, a process which comes in the end to a division by kinds of actors, after all. The nature of the actor or symbol used, is, however, a matter of the least significance in the fable, provided that it be suitable to the object in view. What Lessing attempted and, as it seems to me, failed to accomplish, owing to a faulty definition and a misconception of allegory, must be done, however, if we are to arrive at a satisfactory scheme. It is necessary to classify according to the essential nature of the fable.¹

The core of the fable, as I have previously attempted to show, is that it aims to fix certain truths in the minds of its readers by allegorical representation. However much the different varieties of the fable blend, one thing is clear—three large groups can be discerned: (1) fables in which the actors, some or all (with the setting), and the action are both symbolic; (2) those in which only the actors (with the setting) are symbolic, while the action is that of typical human beings; and (3) those in which only the action is symbolic, while the actors consist of typical human beings.

Before refining on this scheme let me put it concretely. I shall choose my illustrations as far as possible from the fables of Marie de France,² and later make application of the proposed scheme of classification to her collection. It is broad enough in its range, with one exception to be noticed later, to serve this purpose very well.

Take, for example, the fifth fable, "De cane et umbra." This tale, by reason of its closeness to nature, may be considered a mere illustrative tale from nature, or it may be considered a fable, according as the reader fails to identify the actor in it with a human type and takes it literally, or as he actually interprets it in human terms. In tales of this sort the fable makes its closest approach to literature of non-allegorical nature analogy.³ When, however, it is considered a fable, it is not merely the actor that must be interpreted. A dog crosses a bridge with a cheese in his mouth. He sees the shadow of the cheese reflected in the stream below. Plunge! Snap! and he is

¹ It will not be necessary to pause on other equally unsatisfactory classifications, like those of Addison (*Spectator*, 183) or Hawkesworth (*Adventurer*, 18).

² *Die Fabeln der Marie de France* (ed. E. Mall and K. Warnke [= *Bib. norm.*, VI], Halle, 1898).

³ *Jour. of Eng. and Germ. Phil.*, XIV, 524.

struggling empty-mouthed to shore, substance and shadow vanished in the stream. Say that the dog is the greedy man, the cheese a symbol of that which he already has, the shadow an unattainable but coveted object, and so on; this still leaves the story incoherent. We must also translate the acts of plunging, snapping, and dropping into terms of human action. It is therefore apparent that in fables of this sort *both actors (with setting) and action are symbolic*, and only by a translation of both (subconscious, of course, and not mechanical, as in the present analysis) do we arrive at the typical human story underneath, which in reality presents the lesson.

In fables of the first main group the action is that natural to the symbols and totally different in detail from that which it symbolizes. In the second large division, however, the action is not to be derived from any scene in natural life. While the actors preserve their distinctly symbolic form, *the action is that of the typical human beings they represent, more or less adapted, it is true, to the requirements of these symbols*, but still in motive and accomplishment clearly human.

Take, for example, to illustrate this group in the large, the sixty-seventh fable of Marie, "De corvo pennas pavonis inveniente." A crow, finding some peacock feathers and despising herself because less beautiful than the other birds, pulls out her own plumage and decks herself in that which she has found. Fine feathers do not make fine birds, however, and her manners betray her. The real peacocks beat her with their wings. Then she would like to be a simple crow again, but now they all shun her, or chase and beat her. This action finds no counterpart in nature, but is fashioned to represent, with more or less exactitude, the typical conduct of many a vain, dishonest person, ranging all the way from the wearing of apparel belonging to another, or not paid for, to the more metaphorically suggested stealing of another's honors. In any case, it is human action, to a large extent, which is set forth—adapted, however, to the nature of the symbols. The crow must pull out her own feathers (an act at least possible to the crow) before she puts on the peacock's glory (an act impossible to the crow, but, translated, the proper thing for the human actor to do). This main division is the largest.

To illustrate the third main division, it is necessary to go outside the collection of Marie, which has not replaced the twenty-nine fables

of Phaedrus introducing men (cast out by the *Primitive Romulus*, to which she ultimately goes back) by any sufficiently clear fables of this sort. Here *the actors are typical human figures, but the action is symbolic*. There are certain tales of men whose conduct is too preposterous to be accepted literally, which readily suggest a very different type of action and give the lesson for it. Take for example this fable of Aesop:

A Man and his Son were once going with their Donkey to market. As they were walking along by its side a countryman passed them and said: "You fools, what is a Donkey for but to ride upon?"

So the Man put the Boy on the Donkey and they went on their way. But soon they passed a group of men, one of whom said: "See that lazy youngster, he lets his father walk while he rides."

So the Man ordered his Boy to get off, and got on himself. But they hadn't gone far when they passed two women, one of whom said to the other: "Shame on that lazy lout to let his poor little son trudge along."

Well, the Man didn't know what to do, but at last he took his Boy up before him on the Donkey. By this time they had come to the town, and the passers-by began to jeer and point at them. The Man stopped and asked what they were scoffing at. The men said: "Aren't you ashamed of yourself for over-loading that poor Donkey of yours—you and your hulking son?"

The Man and Boy got off and tried to think what to do. They thought and they thought, till at last they cut down a pole, tied the Donkey's feet to it, and raised the pole and the Donkey to their shoulders. They went along amid the laughter of all who met them till they came to Market Bridge, when the Donkey, getting one of his feet loose, kicked out and caused the Boy to drop his end of the pole. In the struggle the Donkey fell over the bridge, and his fore-feet being tied together, he was drowned.

"That will teach you," said an old man who had followed them: "Please all, and you will please none."¹

Here is a "noodle" story² moralized. As the first group brought the fable nearest to a mere analogy in nature, so this group brings it nearest to the simple, illustrative human tale. This last group of fables can be considered such only when the reader actually substitutes for the preposterous or incredible action of the tale the plausible and typical action it suggests, which may be represented in the

¹ J. Jacobs, *The Fables of Aesop, Selected* (London, 1894), p. 149.

² W. A. Clouston, *The Book of Noodles* (London, 1903).

present case by supposing this same "noodle" of a farmer to be a political candidate publishing promises equally favorable to two opposing factions.

There are two ways of looking at such a tale, just as there were for those of the first group. It may be considered as merely the narrative of a typical act exaggerated until it becomes a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle involved, in which case the action is still typical and the tale no fable; or it may be treated as not being intended literally, in which case it becomes in a way allegorical and consequently a fable. In different settings and with different people it would be treated variously. As has been said, this class represents the shading off of the fable into the non-fable on the one extreme, as the first did on the other.

It will now be necessary to see how these three main divisions subdivide and shade off into each other.

I

a) Among all the fables of Marie there are only two tales which, *because they tell a credible nature story*, could be taken literally as illustrative examples. Such tales in fable collections are far outnumbered by clear-cut fables. The two fables in question are the fifth, already cited, and the sixty-third, "De equo et agro," that very short narrative of the horse which, seeing the grass in the field, but not the hedge inclosing it, leaped, and was staked.

It seems fitting to include in this main division two more subgroups which show the form represented above shading off into the second main group. These still have at bottom an incident in nature which might be taken literally; but they already begin to attribute human characteristics to irrational creatures, characteristics tending to that identification necessary for allegory.

b) *Incidents which could have their germ in true observation of nature, but which are supplemented by the imputation to irrational creatures of the power to say what a rational creature so placed might be expected to think or say.* This closely relates the speaker with a definite human type. There are sixteen fables in this class, for which brief illustrations will serve. First, the well-known fable "De gallo et gemma" (Marie, I): here the dunghill cock, looking for

food, finds a pearl and scorns it in round words. Another is "De vipera et campo" (LXXXII): a serpent passes through the midst of a field, and the field cries out: "Look you! Don't take any of me away." Another is "De femina et gallina" (CII): a woman watches her hen scratching for food. For love, she offers it a full measure every day, that it may cease from toil. The hen responds that if she gave it a half-bushel, it would not leave off seeking more according to its nature and custom. "The Belly and the Members" (XXVII) is another well-known example.¹

c) The last subdivision of this group goes beyond the preceding in its divergence from the simple nature story. Here are narratives which have as their germ the *observation of actual facts in nature*, as the peculiarity of some animal (some of the *pourquoi* stories belong here, some have developed further) or the power of some natural object, but which are *elaborated and amplified by the imagination and carried farther from nature, nearer to the type*.

Such a fable is "De simia et vulpe" (XXVIII): an ape asks a fox whom he meets to give him a bit of his tail. He has more than he needs and the young apes have none. "Surely," said the fox, "I shall not, by my tail, great as it is, exalt your children into another kingdom or race, even if it were so great that I could not drag it." Another fable of the same class is "De sole nubente" (VI): the sun wishing to wed, all creatures appeal to Destiny, who, after hearing one of them argue that if the sun be reinforced everything will be scorched, forbids the bans. Still another is the pathetic tale of the poor little dunghill beetle ("De scarabaeo," LXXIV), who saw with envious eyes how the eagle flew. In his pride, he says to the other beetles that the "sepende" has done them an injustice. The eagle's voice is no higher than his, and the beetle's body is as shiny, though the eagle is so large. He begins to wish never to enter his dunghill again. He wants to live with "the other birds." He begins to sing very badly. He takes a leap after the eagle. Before he has gone very far he is dazed with fright. He can mount no higher, nor get back to his dunghill. He is hungry. He complains. Little cares he if the birds hear him, or if any of them mock him, any more than

¹ Also Nos. XX, XXIV, XXVII, XXXVIII, XL, XLIX, LIX, LXXIX, LXXXIV, XC, XCI, XCVII.

did the fox, when the beasts held him base; little he cares if one hold him worm or bird, but only that he may enter once more the dung of the horse, for he is hungry.¹

II

These last two subdivisions have brought us a long way toward Group II, that in which *the action is that of typical human beings, more or less adapted to the symbols employed*. Here identification with the type becomes more and more complete, until the figures are little more than men in masquerade, as in the last subdivision of the group.

a) Here the action is not to be traced to any scene in nature, but is clearly *typical human action translated or adapted into terms of the symbols*. A good illustration of this division is the fable "De corvo et vulpe" (XIII): a crow steals a cheese from an open window. A fox, loving this delicacy, observes the bird and sighs to himself: "What a lovely bird! Can she sing?" The bird attempts the proof, whereupon the fox's interest in music and crow vanishes, together with the cheese. Here is a young Lothario indeed, flattering and ogling, but after all angling for a cheese and adapting his flattery to the particular failing of the symbol. The mere fact that a veritable Lothario might flatter with the same query makes the identification fortuitously the closer. Here, too, belongs the tale "De simia et prole eius" (LI): a mother ape fondly shows her infant to various animals, who make fun of its ugliness. The bear, however, admires it, asks to hold it, to kiss it, and—quickly devours it. Another familiar illustration is that of the ass who would play the lap dog (XV).²

b) The next subdivision differs only in the degree in which the adaptation to the symbols is carried out. Here we have clearly *typical action, partly adapted to the requirements of the symbols, but mingled with details appropriate only to human beings*. Here, for

¹ Other clear cases: XVI, XXXI, LXXXV, XCVI, XCVIII. No. XXIII comes in here, although the detail of the assembling of the beasts tends to take it into one of the subdivisions of Group II.

² Also Nos. VIII, XVII, XVIII, XXII, XXVI, XXX, XXXIII, XXXV, XXXVII, LXVI, LXXIII, LXXV, LXXX, XCH, XCVIII. "De vulpe et gallo" (LX), familiar through "The Nonnes Preestes Tale," is peculiar in that it comprises a combination of two actions and two morals. "De vulpe et umbra lunae" (LVIII) is a very good animal "noodle" story on the "cheese-raking" motive, but made into a passable fable.

instance, we find an established court, and court dignities, the animals assembled in parliaments, and the use of details appropriate only to the life of man—doors, bread, letters, etc.

Take, for example, the fable of the "Fox and the Dove" ("De vulpe et columba," LXI): a fox sees a dove sitting aloft and invites it to come down into a more sheltered place—by him. The dove need not fear, for the *king* has sent a *letter* to the *assembled* beasts commanding universal peace. The dove agrees to descend, but mentions casually that it sees two knights with dogs approaching. The fox thinks it best to take to the woods: "The dogs may not have heard the command."¹ Or the "Wolf and the Crane" ("De lupo et grue," VII) may be taken. A wolf gets a bone in his throat. Of all the birds called together, only the crane can help. She performs the operation, but receives instead of the promised recompense only the injunction to be thankful she escaped with her life. Another is "De formica et cicada" (XXXIX): the cricket, who sang in the summer, seeks food in vain, when the winter comes, at the door of the ant. Other familiar illustrations are the "City Mouse and the Country Mouse" (IX) and the "Crow in Borrowed Plummage" (LXVII), already cited.²

c) The last subdivision is the result of an extension of the humanizing process to an extreme where almost no adaptation to the symbolic form is attempted in the action. Here the figures are men slightly veiled. The masks are on. Here is *typical action with little more translation than the bare use of symbolic forms for actors*.

A lying dog ("De cane et ove," IV) falsely *accuses* a sheep of having *stolen* some *bread*. He *produces before the judge, for witnesses*, the hawk and the wolf. The sheep is compelled to *sell his wool* in the winter, dies, and is devoured by the three. A grim and unflinching picture of justice in the Middle Ages. In "De milvo" (LXXXVI) a kite, very sick, repents him of his past conduct toward the family of a neighboring jay. He asks his mother to beg the jay to

¹ Dr. H. S. Canby, *The Novella and Related Varieties of the Short Narrative* (Yale Dissertation), p. 243, calls this a *beast novella*, and indeed the story side is developed; a wise action, however, is held up to admiration in true fable manner.

² Others are Nos. II, III, X, XI, XII, XIV, XIX, XXIX, XXXVI, XLVI, LXII, LXVI, LXX, LXXI, LXXXI, LXXXIII, LXXXIX, XCIII, CI. In No. LXXXIII the lesson is less obvious, and it is called a *novella* by Dr. Canby. It gives an instructive view of life, however, in fable manner.

pray for him. She responds that his past actions render this request impossible. Perhaps "De agno et capra" (XXXII) is less clear. A sheep had a lamb which shepherds took from it. A goat nourished it until it grew large, then said, "Go to the sheep, thy mother, or the wether, thy father; I have nourished thee long enough." He answered wisely and said that he considered her his mother who had fed him, rather than her who bore and left him—a fable which emphasizes the truth that blood is thinner than milk. This "translation" of the Ruth and Naomi story would seem to belong in this group.¹

III

We finish the survey of the real fables in Marie by returning once more to the third main division, Group III, that in which the *actors are typical and the action symbolic*. We have gone the full swing from fables that approximate the simple nature analogy, through the fables of clear allegorical import, to those approaching the illustrative human narrative. This class needs no subdivision, and has already been illustrated.

In every large collection of fables there are included many tales which cannot be brought under any real definition of the fable, and which have led some, Diestel for instance,² to define not the fable, but the pointed anecdote. These other stories, whether they be Milesian tales of salty flavor, churchmen's *exempla*, sometimes even more briny, or bits of popular superstition, have been intermingled with the fables because they have happened to be of a similar length and have a common origin in reflection upon human life. Dr. Canby points out some twenty-five tales among the fables of Marie which he classes generally as *novelle*, and more exactly as *novelle*, *beast novelle*, and *anecdotes*, the last being an unexpanded form of the preceding and exhibiting less generalization.³ These are characterized by a lighter emphasis on the moral than the fable requires. To me the final distinction between the fable and the illustrative tale is to be found in the allegorical nature of the former, a distinction

¹ Others are Nos. XXXIV, L, LXV, LXXVII, LXXVIII, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII.

² G. Diestel, *Bausteine zur Geschichte der deutschen Fabel* (Dresden, 1871).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

which goes beyond the mere emphasis on the moral in the one and on the story in the other, though no doubt resulting from the existence of that emphasis, while the type was still in the short-story ferment out of which all the various forms emerged. My list of tales in Marie that are not fables differs, however, from Dr. Canby's in only one or two particulars. As to classification, we can call them all *novelle*, if we like, as in these the moral force they have is not assisted by allegory. Five different kinds of stories, however, may be distinguished:

1. *Animistic beast-tales, which, by the absence of a clearly perceptible human purpose, fall short of clear allegory and of the fable type.* In this group various subgroups might be indicated, like that which displays the *shrewd beast* who amuses by outwitting. Here the actor comes close to a human type, but is not interpreted, as no apparent moral lesson or human purpose establishes the identification. After all, it is the beast's shrewdness that counts. Of this sort is "De leone infirmo" (LXVIII), in which the fox plays physician and outwits the malicious wolf.¹ Not all of these animistic tales, however, are to be included in clearly marked subcategories. "De lupo et scarabaeo" (LXV) is of a *fabliau* sort—comparable in part to No. XLIII, classed in the next division—and so slight, so cluttered, and so smirched as to be of practically no moral or allegorical significance.

2. There are also many perfectly clear little *fabliaux*, short realistic tales of human life with a tang to them. "De uxore mala et marito eius" (XCV) is an example. A farmer's wife opposes her husband in everything. His laborers want beer and bread. He thinks to avoid granting the request by sending them to her. When she learns that he is against the proposal, she says they shall have what they ask, but she will bring the refreshment herself and the farmer shall have none. After she has brought the food and drink, the farmer approaches her, and she, retreating, falls into the river. The laborers begin to look for her down the stream, but the farmer tells them to look above the place of the catastrophe, saying that she was so much against everything, that she would not have gone down stream with the current.

¹ Others are Nos. XXI and LXIX.

In this group are tales of the *troublesome* or *disputatious wife* (XCIV), the *deceived husband* (XLIV, XLV), the *inconstant widow* ("Widow of Ephesus" story, XXV), the *man got with child* (XLII, XLIII), and of *justice won by a quip* (XLVII) or *injustice through a bribe* (LVI). Under the same head might be grouped such mere anecdotes as "De homine et hirco" (LXIV), and "De homine et servis" (XLI): a powerful man, coming upon two serfs, noticed that they talked very secretly together, although no one was near. When asked, they said that it was not from fear of being overheard, but because they thought it looked wise to talk in that manner.

The three groups that remain to be noticed consist of tales especially adapted for use as *exempla*, being more moral in tendency, though the mediaeval preacher, of course, was not squeamish.

3. First, there are the moral, illustrative tales involving *popular superstition*, like "De fure et sortilega" (LXVIII): a witch proposes a partnership with a thief, promising her protection. When he is caught and supplicates her assistance, she "bears him in hand" until the rope is about his neck, and then tells him to shift for himself, as she can do no more. More markedly superstitious and more popular is "De dracone et homine" (LII): a dragon has a peasant for companion. He tells the peasant that all his power resides in an egg, which he puts into the peasant's keeping. He then goes away. The man, thinking to kill the dragon and have his treasure, breaks the egg, only to have his treachery revealed to the returning dragon. Such tales might be placed in the third main group of fables. Another tale on the "Greedy Ingrate" theme is "The Man and the Serpent" (LXXII). The motive of the "Three Wishes" appears in "De rustico et nano" (LVII).

4. Again, there are simple, illustrative moral tales of a sort *too moral and too dignified* to be grouped with the *fabliaux*, such as "De sene et equite" (C): a knight meets an old man who seems wise and far-traveled, so he asks him in what land he may best dwell. The old man instructs him to go (1) where the people shall all love him; failing that, (2) where the people shall all fear him; if that prove impossible, (3) where nobody shall fear him; or, as a last resort, (4) where he shall see no one and no one shall know where he is.

5. Finally, there are tales which have specific *relation to ecclesiastical or religious matters*, like "De rustico orante et equum petente" (LIV): a peasant, tying his only horse outside the minster, goes within and prays for another horse. Meanwhile a thief absconds with the one which he had. When the peasant sees the misfortune which has come upon him through his greed, as it is made to appear, he returns and prays, not for a second horse, but to have his own returned. (Similarly LIII, LV.) In this group is one little "miracle," "De homine in nave" (XCIX): a rich man wishes to cross a sea to transact business. He prays God to lead him there in safety. He wishes to return, and prays God not to let him perish. Before he is aware of danger, he is cast into the sea. Then he prays God to bring him to land, this only and nothing more. When he sees God regards not this prayer, he cries, "Let Him do His will," and immediately after this, he arrives at his desired port.

This survey does not pretend to embrace all the varieties of tales that have been included in fable collections. It intends merely to show, in a general way, their nature and how they differ from the fable.

M. ELLWOOD SMITH

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY